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Abstract 
 
This paper presents an index of Fiscal Illusion for 68 democratic countries from 1960 to 2006. 
The studied Fiscal Illusion is the one related to a wrong perception of the budget aggregates 
according to the voters and taxpayers’ perspectives. In the construction of the index, 
methodological issues were carefully taken into account. The results obtained reveal that 
fiscal illusion varies greatly around the world. Countries such as Mali, Pakistan, Russia and 
Sri Lanka have the highest average values over the time period considered; while Austria, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands and New Zealand have the lowest. Regarding the time dimension, 
between 1980 and 1995 there was a significant decrease in the average value of the index 
across countries, suggesting a reduction in the adoption of fiscal illusion measures during this 
period. After 1995, the index remained stable in most of the countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Governance practices in democracies around the world have attracted an increasing interest 
among academics and policymakers in recent years. While some nations monitor the well-
being of democratic institutions and the fulfilment of citizens’ rights, there are still countries 
that do not monitor governance practices. This paper presents estimates of a fiscal illusion 
index that varies across countries and over time, allowing for an overall picture of fiscal 
illusion across the globe from 1960 onwards. 
 
However, until now, there has not been an effort in order to measure the intensity of the Fiscal 
Illusion practices. There also has not been a work that has made the evaluation of the 
evolution of this phenomenon possible. This paper intends to fulfil these scientific needs, 
presenting at last an index of the fiscal illusion observed for 68 countries since 1960. 
   
Several studies analyse the status of transparency in democratic countries. They are concerned 
with specific regions (Alesina et al., 1996), with the bureaucratic quality (Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Zoido-Lobatón, 1999), with particular codes of good practices on fiscal transparency 
(Hameed, 2005), or with previously selected political dimensions (Bernoth and Wolff, 2006). 
While these indicators are useful to understand the status of governance for a single indicator 
or, at best, in a single perspective (rulers/incumbents/politicians), they cannot give us a 
complete measure of the overall wellbeing of a democracy because they do not take into 
account the quality of other institutions – voters, lobbying groups, and society as a whole. 
 
This warning for observing “rulers” and “ruled” groups was first enunciated by Puviani 
(1903), the pioneer of the “Fiscal Illusion“ debate. Some years after the Scottish enlightment 
in Italy, Amilcare Puviani (1903) intended to answer the question: “How can a politician best 
use his powers of the purse to promote his political projects?” with his work “The Theory of 
Fiscal Illusion.” Puviani (1903) introduced the hypothesis of “Fiscal Illusion” as an 
observable answer to the reported question. With these terms, Puviani (1903) wanted to point 
out the opacity that could be administered by public decision-makers in the imposition of 
taxes or in public spending management. These kinds of illusions are the product of a 
relationship between electors and rulers; therefore, they can only be studied considering both 
sides. 
 
Puviani himself did not present a clear definition for Fiscal Illusion and the most recent 
authors do not converge into a unique notion (as denounced by Mourao, 2007). However, for 
operationality, I think that the less polemical definition is close to that defining Fiscal Illusion 
as a wrong perception of the budget aggregates according to the voters’ and taxpayers’ 
perspectives. 
 
This paper builds an index for Fiscal Illusion to provide a clear benchmark. Such a 
benchmark, clearly recognized as an original effort in the literature, is useful for evaluating 
the political performance of democratic countries; for evaluating their performance across 
periods; for comparing the performance of groups of countries; for determining the efforts in 
order to replicate good governance practices and to eradicate “Fiscal Illusion” practices. 
 
There are several problems in constructing such an index. First, the correct dimensions related 
to the methodological sense of Fiscal Illusion shall be selected. Therefore, it is time to discuss 
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data availability, the processes of minimizing the lack of data for the observations, the 
extraction of efficient information with the provided values—not forgetting the nature of the 
values (time-series-cross-section data ones), and to find the correct method of combining the 
variables into a single index. Additionally, this index shall be useful and readable.  
 
This paper is a response to the lack of a convenient methodology to measure the Fiscal 
Illusion phenomenon across the democratic world. Drawing on 68 democracies observed for 
more than 40 years, it has provided a picture of democratic quality and persistence of illusory 
practices across the sample. 
 
Section 2 provides a detailed description of a theoretical framework around the Fiscal Illusion 
theme. In Section 3 the rationale behind the construction of indexes for evaluating political 
and economic realities is described. In Section 4, data and methodological issues are 
discussed. Section 5 explores the results of this analysis. Section 6 is a brief conclusion and 
discussion of future work. 
 
2. A Theoretical Framework 
 
This section tries to highlight the deep complexity behind the studies around the Fiscal 
Illusion theme, suggesting a vast related theoretical framework. For those interested in more 
theoretical developments, Mourao (2007) expands on these issues. 
 
In 1967, James Buchanan signed the work Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal 
Institutions and Individual Choice. In Chapter 10, the term The Fiscal Illusion appears as the 
title. According to him, the discussion of Amilcare Puviani’s (1903) main theoretical 
contribution—the original Illusione Finanziaria—that he had already promoted in Fiscal 
Theory and Political Economy, edited in 1960, remained the only available summary in 
English. After Buchanan’s quotes, other authors have used the term Fiscal Illusion for many 
purposes and with many different senses. This sub-section intends to highlight the most 
prominent of these studies on Fiscal Illusion. 
 
According to Puviani’s original idea, the objective of the ruling group is to design the fiscal 
system so that the resistance of the dominated class is effectively minimized. Consequently, 
the rulers ask: “In order to minimize taxpayer’s resistance for any given level of revenues 
collected, how should the fiscal system be organized?” The answer relies on both sides of the 
budget – “illusions” are created through taxes and through public spending programs.  
 
The most relevant side is the branch of public revenues. This branch can be subdivided into 
seven means of introducing fiscal illusion (Buchanan, 1967):  
- reducing the visibility of the individual shares in the opportunity cost of public 
outlays;  
- utilization of institutions of payments that are planned so as to bind the 
requirement to a time period or an occurrence which the taxpayer seems likely to 
consider cheering;  
- charging explicit fees for nominal services provided upon the occurrence of 
impressive or pleasant events;  
- levying taxes that will capitalize on sentiments of social fear, making the burden 
appear less than might otherwise be the case;  
- use of “scare tactics” that have a propensity to make the alternatives to particular 
tax proposals appear worse than they are;  
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- fragmentation of the total tax weight on an entity into numerous small levies;  
- opacity of the final incidence of the tax. 
 
The dimensions suggested by the lecture of Buchanan (1967) on Puviani (1903) generate the 
possibility of studying the fiscal illusion through the analysis of some particular variables. 
These variables shall reflect the composition of public revenues (like Herfindahl indexes of 
public revenues, the observation of the weights of some revenues, like those generated in 
indirect taxes or collected from the transfers among private agents, or the relationship 
between indirect and direct taxes). Additionally, these variables shall reflect the relevance of 
public debt and the composition of public debt, observed as a dissuasive mechanism of the 
voters’ wrong perception on the relevance of public programs. 
 
As observed by Lipford (2001), Twight, (1994) and Alesina and Perotti (1996) outlined 
several means by which politicians may make public budgets more opaque, thereby raising 
the transaction costs of checking fiscal conditions for a public subject to fiscal illusion or 
incomplete information: biased macroeconomic forecasts, biased estimates of the effects of 
policy changes on budgetary outcomes, strategic use of on- and off-budget expenditures and 
receipts, manipulation of budgetary baselines, and multiyear budgeting. 
 
Additionally, the analysis suggested by Twight (1994) and Alesina and Perotti (1996) 
presented two evidences. Firstly, it evidenced the budget deterioration as a final consequence 
of fiscal illusion. Secondly, it showed that it becomes easier to achieve more significant 
political rents when the political agents act in some contexts characterised by a lower quality 
of the institutions and where the success of optimistic illusions are more probable, as 
alternatively denounced by Keefer and Knack (1997), Jensen and Vestergaard (1999), or by 
Eusepi (2006).  
 
Von Hagen and Harden (1995) developed a framework in which there is a failure to fully 
internalise the true economic costs of public expenditure – another kind of fiscal illusion. The 
interests of individual spending ministers dominate over the collectivist interest of the 
Minister of Finances. Consensus is achieved in cabinet on the basis of the spending ministers, 
either explicitly or implicitly, backing each other’s bids and resulting in “something for 
everyone” and thus a sub-optimal overall level of spending. In synthesis, a government with a 
high number of ministries (assuming that it is more influenced by external lobbies) tends to 
achieve less efficient results. Therefore, the dimension of the government shall be included in 
the list of variables related to the analysis of fiscal illusion. 
 
The opportunity to expand the assumption of (full) rationality in models of Public Economics 
prompted a reaction from several authors synthesized in Wittman (1995). Wittman (1995) 
does not believe in models assuming homogeneous misinformed electors or consumers. The 
costs of decision making are either ignored or assumed not to distort choice. When outcomes 
do not take place with certainty, then economists typically assume that individuals maximize 
expected utility. In this neoclassical framework, anomalies (of the individual perception) are 
the exception rather than the rule. For instance, in numerous social areas, individuals do not 
have the “required skills,” yet they are able to make the correct decision. Also, if mature 
voters have specific interests or concerns, they can consult special interest groups for 
information on the candidates’ positions on the issues in question. Thus, the maturity of the 
democratic institutions is rather important to the study of fiscal illusion. This maturity can be 
observed in the quality of the voters’ turnout or in the international credit risk of the country, 
in line with Weymouth (2008). 
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Cohen and Percoco (2004) state that the most recent macroeconomic literature has focused on 
the effect of public spending contraction and has provided two alternative theories: the theory 
of asymmetric effects of public spending and the theory of fiscal illusion. In particular, fiscal 
adjustment can be thought of as an illusion when it reduces the budget deficit but the 
government net worth remains unaffected. Easterly (2001) shows that, under certain 
conditions, a government will lower the conventional deficit while leaving its path of net 
worth unchanged and when required to lower its debt accumulation, the government will 
lower its asset accumulation or increase its hidden liability accumulation by an equal amount, 
which follows the structural argument from Easterly (1999). This particular evidence of fiscal 
illusion is more visible when there is an increasing trend in another variable suggested by 
these authors to study fiscal illusion – the proportion of capital transfers in the aggregated 
capital outlays. 
 
Sanz and Velasquez (2003) or Garcia-Alegre and Lopez-Casasnovas (2004) point out the 
need to observe fiscal illusion in the side of public expenditures. They suggest that a 
particular dimension should be specially checked—the dispersion of public expenditures, a 
determinant of political illusion in the budget aggregates. They reveal that a lower value of a 
Herfindahl index related to public expenditures allows a less assertive interpretation by 
taxpayers and it additionally magnifies the opportunism of expenditures.  
 
Wagner (2001) also recognized that Puviani (1903) gave most of his attention to taxation - it 
is there where the term Fiscal Illusion precisely obtains its meaning. Consequently, the 
politician should make taxes become less of a burden than they really are. In his work, 
Wagner (2001) identifies trade taxes as a good form of taxation due to its bad perceptibility 
by voters. 
 
Searching for the psychological foundations of fiscal illusion, Sanandaji and Wallace (2003) 
reported the Theory of Mental Accounting. The Theory of Mental Accounting studies the set 
of cognitive operations used by individuals and households to organize, evaluate and keep 
track of financial activities. According to this theory, physical money is more valuable than 
electronic checks and there is evidence for a kind of public hedonic editing – voters actually 
prefer not to be reminded of the costs of public programs alternatively identified by Winter 
and Mouritzen (2001).  
 
Therefore, this perspective offers both arguments that the underestimation of tax levels could 
be beneficial to a hedonist society but also arguments that support the predictions from the 
Public Choice thought – tax illusion can be used to facilitate rent seeking (as already pointed 
by Keefer and Knack, 1997) and be harmful to the same society. These arguments express that 
some other dimensions shall be studied in the fiscal illusion problem. Namely, the ability of a 
society to inspect budget accounts and to inspect political agents shall be particularly checked. 
This ability can be inferred by the education level of the whole society, by the civic 
intervention, by the development level of mass media, or by checking the electors’ 
preferences in line with Jones (2006). 
 
For P. Jones (2006), fiscal illusion is asymmetric. Within overall government budgets, 
domestic programs are very likely to crowd out international programs. This asymmetric 
fiscal illusion is also evident in questionnaire responses on public expenditure priorities. In 
some polls (like the mentioned British Social Attitudes Survey), health care and education are 
invariably considered first or second priority for additional expenditure. Overseas aid has 
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remained at the bottom with defense expenditure just a little higher. While the relative 
benefits of international programs are underestimated, the relative costs are exaggerated, 
according to P. Jones (2006). P. Jones (2006) stated that this revelation of preferences shall be 
interpreted as a process of signalling electors’ priorities, which can be used by political agents 
for opportunistic ends. 
 
 
Finally, some different examples of illusions that arise by a nexus between monetary and 
fiscal factors are provided by Forte (2004): i) fiscal drag due to the automatic increase of real 
tax rates in a personal income tax due to the loss of value of monetary income subject to the 
progressive rates and of the lump sum deductions from the taxable income; ii) taxation of 
revenues of capital in the income tax at their face value, which normally includes a 
compensation for the loss of value of the capital invested; iii) taxation of profits due to the 
fact that depreciations allowances are based on the book value of the assets and this value in 
most cases is not the actual value but the historical one; iv) the Maastricht rules based on 
nominal deficits rather than real deficits2 (that is, identified to the formula Index of Consumer 
Prices*Debt/GDP + Nominal Deficit) which works for countries with  higher Debt/GDP and 
a greater propensity for inflation (the obtained results from the imposition of budgetary 
restrictions of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Pacts are not sufficiently strong enough to 
improve the performances of those countries). 
 
As observed, the most ancient authors (like Puviani, 1903; or Buchanan, 1967) focused on the 
manipulation of taxes as an instrument of Fiscal Illusion. However, it is possible to recognize 
that the most recent authors (like Von Hagen and Harden, 1995; Sanandaji and Wallace, 
2003; or Garcia-Alegre and Lopez-Casasnovas, 2004) are studying a larger list of dimensions, 
including the public expenditures and the institutional characteristics of the societies. 
 
Therefore, the Fiscal Illusion Index shall be a measure of the use of the instruments that 
generate the Fiscal Illusion phenomenon, considering those variables denounced by the most 
remote authors but not neglecting those variables that the most recent authors are pinpointing, 
such as those deeply concerned with the quality of democratic institutions. 
 
Following the previous paragraphs, Table 2.1 provides a summary of the theoretical 
framework behind the construction of an index related to the phenomenon of Fiscal Illusion. 
It is evident that the dimensions behind this phenomenon are numerous. Besides the 
traditional issues (Composition of Public Revenues, Money creation, Composition of Public 
Debt, or Relevance of certain revenue sources) I also found governmental discourse 
manipulation and electorate beliefs, the immaturity level of the democracies and the 
interaction between interest groups and political behaviour, among others. In Table 2.1, I have 
also reported the suggested variables to study the various faces of Fiscal Illusion according to 
the Literature. 
 
 
                                               
2
 Hahn (1949) had already studied this kind of illusion in a different context (Keynesian policies in the post-II 
World War). 
 7 
 
 
TABLE 2.1 – Authors and their focus on Fiscal Illusion 
Authors Dimensions studied by the authors Suggested variables following the authors 
Puviani (1903) 
Buchanan (1960 and 1967) 
Composition of Public Revenues; 
Composition of Public Debt; Relevance of certain 
revenue sources 
Herfindahl Index of Public Revenues; Percentage 
of taxes on goods and services in total tax 
revenues; Ratio between indirect and direct tax 
revenues; Percentage of Public Debt in the Gross 
National Income; Percentage of short-term public 
debt in the national public debt; Percentage of 
taxes on transfers, on inheritances and gifts in total 
tax revenues; Percentage of taxes on corporate 
profits in total tax revenues. 
 
Von Hagen and Harden 
(1995) 
Number of governmental Ministries 
 
Size of cabinets. 
 
Wittman (1995) 
Weymouth (2008) 
Immaturity level of the democracies Percentage of invalid votes in parliamentary 
elections. 
International country risk. 
 
Twight (1994) 
Alesina and Perotti (1996) 
Forte (2004) 
Effectiveness of public accounts (considering 
Money creation, inflation rates and public debt) 
 
Real Public Budget, according to Forte (2004);  
M2 (annual growth rates) 
 
Keefer and Knack (1997), 
Jensen and Vestergaard 
(1999), 
Eusepi (2006) 
Governmental rent-seeking Government confidence (in public polls); 
Percentage of public employees in the active 
population. 
 
Easterly (1999 and 2001) 
Cohen and Percoco (2004) 
Composition of Public Capital outlays Percentage of expenditures on capital transfers in 
the total expenditures. 
Wagner (2001) Relevance of trade taxes Openness of the economy; 
Percentage of trade taxes in total tax revenues. 
Winter and Mouritzen (2001) 
Sanandaji and Wallace 
(2003) 
Jones (2006) 
Electorate and Parliamentary supervision on 
governmental activity; 
Electorate preferences 
Number of nonprofit organizations per one million 
people; 
Average value of radio receptors, tv sets and 
newspapers per capita; Percentage of education 
expenditures in the total expenditures; Percentage 
of higher school complete in the total population. 
Number of governmental checks and balances. 
Parliamentary power in the Democracy. 
Percentage of answers stating ‘economic growth’ 
as the most important national issue. 
Sanz and Velasquez (2003) 
Garcia-Alegre and Lopez-
Casasnovas (2004) 
Public expenditures manipulation Herfindahl Index of Public Expenditures; 
Percentage of capital and current transfers in the 
total expenditures 
 
 
 
3. The rationale behind an index for the Fiscal Illusion 
 
As observed by Mourao (2007), the phenomenon of Fiscal Illusion is rather complex. This is 
so because nowadays there is a large set of authors who contributed to its study with different 
senses; it is complex because it refers to a wide range of economic realities; finally, its 
complexity is also derived from the methodological use that is given to Fiscal Illusion itself. 
As Mourao (2007) states, sometimes authors use Fiscal Illusion as an assumption; other 
researchers employ the terms relating them to hypotheses of solving previous problems and 
other economists identify Fiscal Illusion with consequences of fiscal manipulation. 
 
In these cases, the construction of an Index that combines the many different dimensions of 
the studied phenomenon is strongly suggested, as mentioned in Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobatón (1999), Nardo et al. (2005) or Mourao (2005). Obviously, there is a preliminary 
problem because there is a loss of information when working with indexes; however, as these 
authors claim, the advantages are more significant than the disadvantages, and the loss of 
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information is often a question of (data) size, not a question of (data) quality if the correct 
methods are followed. 
 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) recognized that aggregate fiscal indicators are 
useful because they allow countries to be sorted into broad groupings according to levels of 
governance, and they can be used to study the causes and consequences of fiscal movements 
in a much larger sample of countries than is usually observed.  
 
Nardo et al. (2005) also recognized that indexes, as composite indicators, provide simple 
comparisons of countries that can be used to illustrate complex and sometimes elusive issues 
in wide ranging fields. These indicators often seem easier to interpret by the general public 
than finding a common trend in many separate indicators and have proven useful in 
benchmarking country performance. 
 
Finally, Mourão (2005) pointed out that working with analytical indexes is better for 
understanding the economic phenomenon than analysing its individual components. Working 
with indexes also avoids the introduction of redundant variables in econometric models, with 
the common problem of losing degrees of freedom and, finally, it is more suitable to truly 
approach the involved methodological complexity. 
 
Additionally, evidence also suggests that studying indexes of complex political and economic 
realities is more efficient than analyzing isolated variables (Alesina et al., 1996; Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón, 1999; Hameed, 2005; Bernoth and Wolff, 2006; Alt and Lassen, 
2006).  
 
Alesina et al. (1996) collected information on the budget institutions of Latin American 
countries. They classified those countries as a function of the values returned from their Index 
of Budgetary Institutions and also as depending on the presence of budgetary practices of 
control. Their Index incorporated ten basic dimensions: constitutional constraints, legal 
requirement for the approval of a macro program, borrowing constraints, authority of minister 
of finances, amendments by the Congress, consequences of Congress’ rejection of the Budget, 
opportunity to modify the Budget after Congress’ approval, opportunity to cut spending by 
the Government after Congress’ approval, assumption by the Government of other political 
agencies’ debt, and autonomy of these other agencies to borrow. They concluded that 
transparent procedures were associated with more fiscal discipline.  
 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) used a simple variant of an unobserved 
components model to combine the information from different sources into aggregate 
governance indicators, intending to provide better information for further empirical studies. 
These authors illustrated the methodology by constructing aggregate indicators of 
bureaucratic quality, rule of law, and graft for a sample of 160 countries.  
 
Hameed (2005) developed indices of fiscal transparency for a broad range of countries based 
on the IMF's Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency, using data derived from 
published fiscal transparency modules of the Reports on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes. The indices cover four clusters of fiscal transparency practices: data assurances, 
medium-term budgeting, budget execution reporting, and fiscal risk disclosures. Hameed 
(2005) concluded that more transparent countries are shown to have better credit ratings, 
better fiscal discipline, and less corruption, after controlling for other socioeconomic 
variables. 
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Alt and Lassen (2006) constructed a transparency index based on 19 advanced industrialized 
OECD economies in the 1990s on four distinct categories: independent verification (for 
example, independently audited in-year financial reports); easy access and monitoring 
governance practices by external agents; clear and pre-defined budget syntax; and the 
presence of more justification of decisions which solidifies the basis for decision making. The 
index included 11 items, and most of them were taken from OECD’s Best Practises for 
Budget Transparency (OECD 2001). Then, Alt and Lassen (2006) aggregated the 11 items 
additively into an index, whose values range from a minimum of zero (Japan) to a maximum 
of 11 (New Zealand). They concluded that electoral cycles exist in low transparency countries 
and that such cycles are statistically and economically significant.  
 
Bernoth and Wolff (2006) captured the concept of governmental informational transparency 
with two measures. One is an index of auditing that they developed, called Audit. This index 
is calculated on the basis of the answers collected by an OECD and World Bank survey 
conducted in 2003, also used by Alt and Lassen (2006). Their index Audit measures whether 
governments are financially audited externally, how independent the auditing can be 
performed and how well the obtained information is disseminated. To each question from the 
OECD and World Bank survey conducted in 2003, Bernoth and Wolff (2006) assigned a 
value between zero and four, where four indicates the response most conducive to fiscal 
”transparency.” This index was computed as the simple sum of the responses to all individual 
questions. The second index is based on a part of the indicator developed in the seminal paper 
by von Hagen (1992), and updated in Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2005). Bernoth 
and Wolff (2006) called this indicator Transparency, though it is a measure of being an 
informative transparency of the budget draft and includes an assessment of transparency given 
by government officials, the degree to which special funds are included in the budget draft, 
the information of whether the budget consists of one document, whether it is linked to 
national accounts and finally whether government loans are included. Bernoth and Wolff 
(2006) concluded that fiscal transparency is connected with lower risk premia in their 
posterior estimations. 
 
However, Alesina et al. (1996), Hameed (2005), and Alt and Lassen (2006), among others, 
specially studied the reverse of Fiscal Illusion – the Fiscal Transparency. Consequently, the 
dimensions they chose to analyse were the ones referring to Governance practices. As the 
authors who specifically studied the Fiscal Illusion notice, this phenomenon is not restricted 
to the ruler agents but it is also verified in the ruled ones, electors and firms. Therefore, a 
good Index for Fiscal Illusion must contemplate this variety of agents and their behaviour. 
 
 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
 
In this section, the main steps behind the construction of the Fiscal Illusion Index will be 
discussed. 
 
As Nardo et al. (2005) argue, economic or social indexes can send misleading policy 
messages if they are poorly constructed or misinterpreted. Therefore, it is very relevant to 
follow prudent steps in order to reach significant aims and to avoid simplistic lectures. 
 
4.1. Variables and sources of data 
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After the identification of the theoretical framework, it is time to find the equivalent variables 
and to select data. Table A1 in the appendix provides a synthesis of this effort. A range of 
twenty-six variables was selected, taking into account their use in the literature (see Table 
2.1), analytical soundness, measurability, country coverage, relevance to the phenomenon 
being measured and relationship to each other, as requested by Nardo et al. (2005) to develop 
a robust index. The data is related to 68 countries, including developing and developed 
countries. The countries3 were selected using Polity IV filter4, following Brender and Drazen 
(2004) who have chosen only those democracies with positive values from the filter. The 
period covered goes from 1960 to 2006. 
 
The main sources of data are Barro and Lee (2000), Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive 
(2006), Database of Political Institutions (2004), Government Finance Statistics (2006), 
International Country Risk Guide (2006), International Financial Statistics (2006), 
International Labour Organization Statistics (2006), Voter Turnout since 1945 (2002), and 
World Development Indicators (2006). The Web sites http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ and 
http://www.idealist.org also provide data. Table A.1 lists the sources for each variable. 
 
Following Shi and Svensson (2002) and Nardo et al. (2005) missing values were filled with 
the national average values of the variables. 
 
Therefore, let iTX  be the random variable associated to country i to be analyzed for T years, 
i.e., { }iTiiiT xxxX ,...,, 21= . Let r be the number of recorded or non-missing values on iTX , and 
T-r the number of missing values. The unconditional mean is then given by:  
 
∑=
recorded
iti x
r
x
1
           (4.1) 
 
The literature on the analysis of missing data is extensive and it is in rapid development. More 
comprehensive surveys can be found in Little and Schenker (1994), Little (1997), and Little 
and Rubin (2002). As Nardo et al. (2005) refer, the unconditional mean imputation is a well-
recurred method classified in the single imputation group with explicit modelling. In the 
single imputation group, the predictive distribution must be generated by employing the 
observed data either through implicit or explicit modelling. The implicit modelling uses past 
or similar observations, and the explicit modelling makes the distribution based on a formal 
statistical model with explicit assumptions. 
 
Nguyen, Wang and Carroll (2004) also recognized that the unconditional mean imputation is 
a simple method that is statistically better than some naïve methods, like replacing the 
missing values with zeros (or a positive constant) in line with Alizadeh et al. (2000). This 
method is also recognized for minimizing index biases because combining several variables 
                                               
3
 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
4
 See http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
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reduces the singular bias of each isolated variable5. Additionally, it is also demonstrated that 
this method minimizes the bias compared with alternative procedures when data evidence a 
cyclical component, as happens with some of the variables used in this work. 
 
Wilks (1932), quoted by Jackson (2003), also suggests to replace each incidence of a missing 
value with the average of all available data in the sample for that particular variable and 
obtain the correlation matrix for this adjusted set of data. Jackson (2003) clearly refers to this 
as one of the most popular techniques for estimating correlation matrices in the presence of 
incomplete data. 
 
But if simplicity is its main appeal, an important limitation of this single imputation method is 
its systematic underestimation of the variance of the estimates. Therefore, this method cannot 
be considered as a panacea that will solely solve the problem of missing values. As Nguyen, 
Wang and Carroll (2004) or Nardo et al. (2005) observe, the researcher must solidify the 
analysis with sensitivity and uncertainty checks carried on the final products (final indexes), 
proceedings followed in this research as later described. Additionally, the researcher must be 
aware that the unconditional mean imputation fits better when it is used with a large number 
of variables (like the number of variables here used), variables related to large cross-sectional 
data samples (and, of course, with a few of the missing points) that, when combined, will 
substantially minimize the pointed biases. 
 
Almost all the variables were used with their provided values or were enriched with the 
previously discussed suggestions (unconditional mean imputation) of Shi and Svensson 
(2002) and Nardo et al. (2005) in this step.  
 
The exceptions were the variables built upon Herfindahl Indexes or growth rates.  
 
In the former case, the Herfindahl Index of a referred fiscal dimension (public expenditures or 
public revenues) followed Pommerehne and Schneider (1978) or Becker (1983) and it was 
defined in the simplest way, as the sum of the squares of the shares of each individual 
component of that fiscal dimension6. In the latter case, the growth rates were computed as the 
difference of two consecutive observations of the logarithmized variable, yearly observed. 
 
4.2. Methodology 
 
Preprocessing 
When there are many variables to be combined into one posterior indicator, Nardo et al. 
(2005) write metaphorically that the researcher must avoid “adding up apples and oranges.” 
Therefore, an effort of normalization is required prior to any data aggregation as the indicators 
in a data set often have different measurement units. Additionally, Kroonenberg (2008) states 
that collected data may not be useful unless the raw values are preprocessed in an appropriate 
way. Then, it is the time for preprocessing the application of techniques to a data set before a 
                                               
5
 Additionally, it is anticipated that through the used Multiway Principal Components Extraction the less 
significant components belong to the variables with the smallest number of non-missing values, strengthening 
the minimization of eventual biases due to the chosen imputation methods when the Factor Loadings are used as 
weights of the variables for generating an index. 
6
 Although the use of Herfindahl indexes has intuitive appeal, it is far from being a perfect measure of tax or 
public spending complexity, since it assumes that different types of taxes have the same potential to deceive 
individuals and create illusions, as clearly enunciated by Ovaska (2003) among others. Therefore, a measure of 
fiscal illusion should combine the different dimensions proposed by the Literature, minimizing the bias induced 
by recurring to isolated (raw) variables that are identified with the phenomenon itself. 
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model is fitted, especially centering, normalization, and standardization. Jolliffe (2002) also 
recognizes that when a variable is used to monitor a process over time (as in our case), its 
successive values are likely to be correlated unless the spacing between observations is large. 
One possibility for taking into account this autocorrelation is to plot normalized values of the 
observed ones, according to Wold (1994). 
 
Freudenberg (2003) and Jacobs et al. (2004) point out the existence of a large range of 
normalization methods. Considering the nature of the data previously described, and the 
limitations of the alternative methods (see Nardo et al., 2005), it was chosen for each 
(country-year) observation the percentile rank7 (as a normalisation method) taking into 
account all observations from each variable and the expected effect on Fiscal Illusion by a rise 
of the variable8. This method allows for the expression of prior units with different measures 
into normalised (and more likely comparable) variables. Additionally, Zimmerman and 
Zumbo (2005) showed that using percentiles markedly increased the power of "t" tests for 
skewed distributions and percentiles were also the most efficient for symmetric distributions 
(as already pointed out in Ferguson, 1976). 
 
The percentile rank is classified as a categorical scale normalization method. In this case, the 
top 1% received a score of 1, the top 2% received a score of 0.99 and so on. This method is 
very useful in economic and social research because it supplies results that allow a kind of 
lecture pointing out the effort of convergence among the cases, from the worst (year-case 
observation) to the best, rewarding the best performing countries and penalising the worst 
(check Angell, 2005 or Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2006, for elucidative examples on 
governance and fiscal institutions quality).  
 
For instance, suppose that the normalised variable X for country C and year Y has the value 
0.840 and suppose that X for C and year Y+5 has the value 0.780. Therefore, I am able to 
suggest that during the period from Y to Y+5, the country C has enlarged its distance (“it has 
diverged from”) to the country-year observation with the highest value of X. In spite of its 
notorious advantages, categorical scales exclude non-negligible amounts of information about 
the variance of the transformed indicators, which reinforce the need of a re-normalization of 
the combined values (Musgrove and Walsh, 2005) and of performing posterior sensitivity and 
uncertainty examinations. 
 
Multiway Data Analysis 
To avoid the common criticism: “indicator rich but information poor,” when indicators are 
selected in an arbitrary manner with little attention paid to the interrelationships between 
them, the data was observed through multivariate analysis. Giving arbitrary weights to the 
indicators that constitute an index (usually, all indicators have the same weight) may lead to 
indices which overwhelm, confuse and mislead decision-makers and the general public. 
 
Although there are some available methods (see Nardo et al., 2005), the chosen method to 
explain the variance of the observed data through a few linear combinations of the original 
                                               
7
 The percentile rank of a country-year observation (it) of variable x is: 
it
itit
xit N
ficfipc 5,0*100
~ +
=
, where itcf  is 
the cumulative frequency for all scores lower than the country-year score of interest, 
itf  is the frequency of the 
score of interest, and itN the number of country-year observations ( itN  is the product between the number of 
countries and the number of annual observations). 
8
 If the expected effect was negative, then the rank was re-ordered, considering the difference between 1 and the 
(raw) percentile rank. Otherwise, the rank was not modified. 
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data was a specific technique belonging to the group of the Multivariate Analysis – the 
Multiway Principal Components Analysis (MPCA). 
 
Before explaining what MPCA is, it is important to understand the concept of Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA). Some interesting references on this method are Hair et al. 
(2005), Kent, Bibby and Mardia (2006), and Johnson and Wichern (2007). PCA is a 
dimensionality reduction technique. It produces a lower dimensional representation in a way 
that preserves the correlation structure between the process variables and is optimal in terms 
of capturing the variability in the data, as argued by Russell, Chiang and Braatz (2000). 
 
When the process involves more than two dimensions (for instance, variables observed for 
some countries in various periods), the PCA method generates the Multiway Principal 
Components Analysis (MPCA). This can be achieved considering a situation in which 
x=1,2,…,X variables are recorded at t=1,2,…,T periods throughout the sample of N countries. 
This results in a three-way data matrix M (X*T*N).  
 
In order to decompose the matrix M, I used the Tucker3 model (Tucker, 1966). In sum 
notation, it becomes: 
 
∑∑∑
= = =
+=
P
p
Q
q
R
r
xtnnrtqxppqrxtn ecbagm
1 1 1
)(  
 
where g is the p*qr matricized core array, c is an n*r column-wise orthonormal matrix 
consisting of country components, and e is the x*tn matrix of residuals. By normalizing the 
data and the solution, the scale components become loadings (variable-component 
correlations; principal coordinates) according to Kroonenberg (2008). 
 
Using MATLAB and the N-way Toolbox version 2, the preferred model was a 4*1*1 (4 
variable components, 1 country component, and 1 time component)9.  
 
In accordance with the relative importance of the component scores, the variability in the 
dimensions country and time is small, indicating a strong, stable time trend and stable country 
groupings. Therefore, I will focus on variable components scores. 
 
We have obtained Table 4.1 that shows that four components were retained (for economy of 
space, the other factors, non-significant, were omitted; the selection was carried on the 
observation of the convex hull derived from the cross-plots of the residual sum of squares and 
the related degrees of freedom, available under request). These components account for more 
than 80% (81.07% to be precise) of the total variation. 
 
TABLE 4.1 - Component loadings for Fiscal Illusion Variables 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion 
Explained 
variability 
1 12.64945 4.17212 0.4080 0.4080 
2 8.47733 6.02921 0.2735 0.6815 
3 2.44812 0.88984 0.0790 0.7605 
                                               
9
 The number of components for the analysis was determined by examining deviance plots for the Tucker3 
model. On the vertical axis the residual sum of squares is shown and on the horizontal axis the associated 
degrees of freedom are plotted. The preferred models lie on a convex hull. Deviance plots and more technical 
details of the dimensionality selection are available under request. 
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4 1.55827 0.50874 0.0503 0.8107 
 
Table 4.2 reveals the varimax component solution for Fiscal Illusion variables, a powerful 
suggestion of the weights that will calibrate each variable in the aggregate index10. These 
results were achieved through the rotation of the component space. 
 
TABLE 4.2 – Varimax component solution for Fiscal Illusion variables 
  Variables 1 2 3 4 
trd 0.92504 0.15369 0.12477 0.15922 
icrg 0.43434 0.38172 0.71098 0.00244 
inv_vot 0.78653 0.55043 0.08307 0.01592 
pub_employ 0.18532 0.93288 0.25430 0.06257 
pres_parl 0.02962 0.16898 0.34620 0.28901 
checks 0.02336 0.01468 0.11139 0.36003 
highedu 0.06366 0.14337 0.31790 0.11634 
gov_confid 0.98835 0.05771 0.02640 0.03472 
higprefer 0.27676 0.89509 0.31793 0.00737 
npopmilli 0.09355 0.17254 0.18554 0.04467 
mediacs 0.08509 0.22399 0.38645 0.22323 
cabin_size 0.69747 0.25477 0.26530 0.23952 
money 0.65390 0.50930 0.36216 0.22573 
shortdebt 0.09845 0.46136 0.26501 0.51703 
pccaptransf 0.80430 0.28685 0.06437 0.27005 
pctransfpart 0.16092 0.94149 0.26535 0.02251 
pcgood 0.79165 0.46705 0.10527 0.09330 
pcinttrade 0.83732 0.44819 0.14381 0.18450 
txherfind 0.84163 0.14843 0.03391 0.25341 
pceduc 0.06191 0.43404 0.17245 0.07932 
herfdesp 0.04717 0.26357 0.05646 0.11338 
ratcurcap 0.78792 0.26162 0.07167 0.20566 
pcprofit 0.56727 0.59957 0.14311 0.24502 
pcinherita 0.43490 0.45362 0.15586 0.42078 
realbud 0.11555 0.16247 0.44526 0.17898 
gnidebt 0.22851 0.83302 0.22043 0.15045 
Legend - Herfindahl Index of Public Revenues [txherfind]; Percentage of taxes on goods and services in total taxes revenues [pcgood]; Ratio 
between indirect and direct taxes revenues [ratcurcap];  Percentage of Public Debt in the Gross National Income [gnidebt]; Percentage of 
short-term public debt in the national public debt [shortdebt]; Percentage of taxes on transfers, on inheritances and gifts in total taxes 
revenues [pcinherita];  Percentage of taxes on corporate profits in total taxes revenues [pcprofit]; Size of cabinets [cabin_size]; Percentage of 
invalid votes in parliamentary elections [inv_vot]; International country risk [icrg]; Real Public Budget, according to Forte (2004) [realbud]; 
M2 (annual growth rates) [money]; Government confidence (in public polls) [gov_confid]; Percentage of public employees in the active 
population [pub_employ]; Percentage of expenditures on capital transfers in the total expenditures [pccaptransf];Openness of the economy 
[trd]; Percentage of trade taxes in total taxes revenues [pcinttrade]; Number of nonprofit organizations per million of people 
[npopmilli];Average value of radio receptors, tv sets and newspapers per capita [mediacs]; Percentage of education expenditures in the total 
expenditures [pceduc]; Percentage of higher school complete in the total population [highedu]; Number of governmental checks and balances 
[checks]; Parliamentary power in the Democracy [pres_parl]; Percentage of answers stating ‘economic growth’ as the most important 
                                               
10
 As Kroonenberg (2008, p. 226) refers, each squared coefficient indicates the explained variability that is used 
instead of its predictor. See, please, for a full explanation of the factor loadings Hair et al. (2005), Kent, Bibby 
and Mardia (2006), or Johnson and Wichern (2007). 
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national issue [higprefer]; Herfindahl Index of Public Expenditures [herfdesp]; Percentage of capital and current transfers in the total 
expenditures [pctransfpart] 
 
 
 
High and moderate loadings (>0.50) indicate how the sub-indicators are related to the 
principal components.  
 
The first component has high positive coefficients (loadings) with Openness of the economy 
(0.93), percentage of invalid votes (0.79), confidence in government (0.99), government size 
(0.70), money creation (0.65), percentage of capital transfers in public capital expenditures 
(0.80), percentage of indirect taxation in public revenues (0.79), percentage of trade taxes in 
total tax revenues (0.84), Herfindahl Index of public revenues (0.84), ratio between indirect 
and direct taxation (0.86) and Percentage of taxes on corporate profits in total tax revenues 
(0.57), indicating that Component 1 may be due to Fiscal Illusion in its strictus sensu, 
motivated by fiscal manipulation used by incumbents. In a very interesting lecture, it is 
observed that this component especially points to the variables already suggested by the first 
generation of authors. 
 
Component 2 is mainly dominated by political-economic variables characterizing the 
electorate, mostly suggested by the most recent authors: Percentage of invalid votes (0.55), 
percentage of public employees in the active population (0.93), percentage of answers stating 
‘economic growth’ as the most important national issue (0.90), growth rate of M2 aggregate 
(0.51), percentage of capital and current transfers in the total expenditures (0.94), percentage 
of taxes on corporate profits in total tax revenues (0.60) and percentage of public debt in the 
Gross National Income (0.83).  
 
Components 3 and 4 are mainly subject to the government’s ability to persuade economic 
agents and to get more significant political rents (reflected in a higher country risk as pointed 
by Keefer and Knack, 1997) and to the short-term debt restrictions. 
 
Weights 
In the last step of the production of the Fiscal Illusion Index, it is time to deal with the 
construction of the weights from the matrix of factor loadings after rotation, given that the 
squares of factor loadings represent the proportion of the total unit variance of the indicator 
which is explained by the factor. The approach used by Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud 
(2000) is that of grouping the sub-indicators with the highest factor loadings in intermediate 
composite indicators, whose number is equal to the number of factors. Therefore, each 
normalised variable with a significant factor loading (greater than 0.7) will have a weight 
equal to the square of the factor loading divided by the explained variation by the factor.11 At 
the end, each intermediate composite indicator will have a weight equal to its proportion of 
the variance explained by all the variables components.12 Finally, as the component scores 
related to the country and to the year are stable, it is advised to not re-compute the final value 
considering these stable dimensions (Jolliffe, 2002; Kroonenberg, 2008).  
                                               
11
 Using data from Tables 4.1 and 4.2, the Factor 1 Intermediate Indicator (F1) for country i at year t is 
ititit pcprofitltrdF 408.0
568.0
...
408.0
925.01
22
++=
, and so on until F4. Therefore, itF1 is a weighted average of the normalised 
variables with a significant factor loading (greater than 0.7) for each country-year observation. 
12
 The (raw, not re-scaled) Fiscal Illusion Indicator ( ~FI ) only considering the variables components is 
ititit FFFI 4811.0
050.0
...1
811.0
408.0~
++=
.  
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In our case, the final value given to each country-year observation is re-scaled, using again the 
percentile rank but considering now all weighted values. Therefore, the Fiscal Illusion Index, 
as a percentile ranking, indicates how a country-year observation performs compared to the 
other country-year observations in its position. The Fiscal Illusion Index ranges from a low of 
0.01 (lowest level of Fiscal Illusion)13 to a high of 0.99 (highest level of Fiscal Illusion)14. A 
0.50 ranking is an average performance. It is implicit that lower levels are associated with a 
less intense  fiscal illusion. This case (lower levels of fiscal illusion) is better to the generality 
of voters/taxpayers, which follows the literature that has mainly pointed to fiscal illusion as a 
source of disutilities for most individuals. 
 
Table A.2 shows values for the first (1960) and last (2006) years of the Fiscal Illusion Index 
for each of the countries. The remaining values are available upon request. 
 
 
4.3. Sensitivity analysis 
 
At the end of the production of the Fiscal Illusion index, it is time to apply uncertainty and 
sensitivity analysis, an essential step in finding out about composite indicators. This step is 
widely applied for the robustness assessment of composite indicators and has proven to be 
useful in dissipating some of the controversy that may surround the interpretation. For this 
purpose, Giglioli and Saltelli (2000) and Nardo et al. (2005) were followed in their three-step 
methodology. 
 
In the first step, for the Fiscal Illusion Index case study, five main sources of uncertainty 
inputs have been addressed: inclusion-exclusion of one variable at-a-time, imputation of 
missing data, different distribution functions characterising the variables for each country 
during the sample period, different weighting schemes and different aggregation schemes. For 
a detailed explanation see Nardo et al. (2005). 
 
The second step is the moment to generate randomly N combinations of uncertainties. For 
each trial sample, the computational model can be evaluated, generating values for the scalar 
output variable (the value of the rank assigned by the composite indicator to each country-
year observation or the averaged shift in that rank). 
                                               
13
 This observation is for New Zealand, 2002. Some of the variables’ values are: Herfindahl Index of Public 
Revenues (0.449); Percentage of taxes on goods and services in total tax revenues (19.4%); Ratio between 
indirect and direct tax revenues (0.360); Percentage of taxes on corporate profits in total tax revenues (9.30%); 
Average value of radio receptors, TV sets and newspapers per capita (30450); Percentage of education 
expenditures in the total expenditures (13.9%); Percentage of higher school completed in the total population 
(16.0%); Percentage of invalid votes in parliamentary elections (0.66%); International Country Risk (13.65); 
Number of non-profit organizations per million people (29.58); Percentage of public employees in the total 
active population (5.1%); and Herfindahl Index of Public Expenditures (0.715). 
 
14
 This observation is for Sri Lanka, 1988. Some of the variables’ values are: Herfindahl Index of Public 
Revenues (0.209); Percentage of taxes on goods and services in total tax revenues (35.2%); Ratio between 
indirect and direct tax revenues (2.501); Percentage of taxes on corporate profits in total tax revenues (7.62%); 
Average value of radio receptors, to sets and newspapers per capita (1987); Percentage of education expenditures 
in the total expenditures (8.50%); Percentage of higher school completed in the total population (0.8%); 
Percentage of invalid votes in parliamentary elections (5.45%); International Country Risk (0.00); Number of 
non-profit organizations per million people (2.76); Percentage of public employees in the total active population 
(8.23%); and Herfindahl Index of Public Expenditures (0.228). 
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In the third step, close the loop over the combinations and analyse the resulting output vector. 
The sequence of this final output vector, such as the variance and higher order moments, can 
be estimated with an arbitrary level of precision that is related to the size of the simulation. 
 
Observing the previous steps and referring to the software SimLab 1.1, it has a final output 
vector that evidences the simulated distribution for each country-year observation embodying 
the described uncertainty factors. Figure A.1 shows the correlation between the raw values of 
the reference Fiscal Illusion Index and the central values of the output generated by SimLab 
1.1 (after running 10000 simulations). As it can be observed, there is a high pattern of 
correlation, indicating robustness of the Fiscal Illusion Index values. Figure A.1 shows only 
the cases for two years (1960 and 2006), although the simulation was carried out for all years 
in the sample, and is available upon request. 
 
The margins of error for the aggregate Fiscal Illusion indicator are displayed in the two panels 
of Figure A.2, where countries are organized in ascending order according to their point 
estimates of Fiscal Illusion Index in 1960 and in 2006 on the horizontal axis, and on the 
vertical axis I plot the raw values of the index and the associated 90% confidence intervals 
(right label) and the amplitude of the intervals (left label). These intervals indicate the range 
in which it is 90 percent likely that the true score falls. As observed, the ranges are not 
significantly large, indicating reasonable estimates. It is also observed that the amplitude of 
the intervals tends to diminish between 1960 and 2006. 
 
Composite indicators, like the Fiscal Illusion Index, often measure concepts that are linked to 
well-known and measurable phenomena or to other indexes. These links can be used to test 
the explanatory power of a composite. Simple cross-plots are often the best way to illustrate 
such links. 
 
Figure A.3 illustrates this aspect. There, it is confirmed that higher GDP per capita, 
government transparency and good governance practices are negatively associated with Fiscal 
Illusion, while a higher international risk is positively associated with Fiscal Illusion, being in 
accordance with prior expectations (that Fiscal Illusion reduces the economic growth, it 
happens more in countries with low levels of development and with less transparent 
governance practices and it worsens the competitiveness of a country in the international 
markets).  
 
Synthesizing the methodological steps that produced the Fiscal Illusion Index, I can state the 
following. First of all, the index is the result of a construction that aimed to measure the 
degree of national fiscal illusion through a combination of the various instruments (variables) 
that produce the phenomenon according to the Literature. This combination followed a 
detailed set of steps, since the theoretical framework until sensitivity tests on final results. At 
last, an index was achieved. This index reflects the multiplicity of dimensions studied by the 
authors, like the taxes manipulation (particularly studied by the most remote authors) or the 
relevance of the social-economic pattern of the electorate (particularly studied by the most 
recent authors). The values cover a large period (1960-2006) for a considerable set of 
countries (68 countries). 
 
The following section suggests a lecture on these values. 
 
5. Fiscal Illusion across the democracies – some comments on the Results 
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As mentioned, Table A.2 shows two values (1960 and 2006, the first and the last years) of the 
Fiscal Illusion Index for each one of the studied countries. Higher values of the index reveal 
higher patterns of Fiscal Illusion. Table A.2 also identifies the national improvement (third 
column, difference between the percentile rank of 1960 to that of 2006) and each country’s 
average and standard deviation values (fourth column). 
 
The decrease in the values of the Fiscal Illusion index for all countries between 1960 and 
2006 reveals that there has been a generalized reduction in fiscal illusion over time. 
Therefore, I can infer that democratic maturity improves good governance practices, 
consequently reducing Fiscal Illusion levels. 
 
However, this reduction was not equal across countries. The most significant improvements 
occurred in countries like Belgium, Italy, Portugal or Spain, with a decrease of more than fifty 
percent. Although more work needs be done in order to clarify the particular reasons behind 
this variety of behaviours, there are some general determinants that can be pointed out. These 
determinants are related to the deep changes in the significant reduction of the percentage of 
invalid votes (reflecting a more assertive electorate) and to the significant integration into the 
world markets (which promotes an additional need of evidencing better fiscal results as a 
source of competitiveness). These were especially noticed in the last years of the sample (end 
of the 1990s and beginning of the 21st century). 
 
It is also interesting to analyze the central value for each country, shown in the fourth column 
from Table A.2. The countries with the highest values are El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
India, Madagascar, Mali, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia and Sri Lanka. Conversely, Austria, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands and New Zealand are some of the countries with the lowest 
average values.  
 
Trying to identify group patterns, Figure 5.1 presents the average value for each year for 
different selections. Countries were grouped according to two dimensions: age of democracy 
(old/new democracies) and degree of development of the country (developed/developing). 
Following Brender and Drazen (2004), developed countries include the OECD Economies 
that were members of the organization during the entire sample period, plus Spain, Portugal, 
Greece and Turkey, examples of “new” democracies. Twenty-four countries in our sample 
belong to this group and the other 44 are classified as developing countries. Old democracies 
include the established democracies (that is, all countries which were in a sample of 
democracies using the POLITY filter, excluding the new democracies). In our sample and 
following Brender and Drazen (2004), 32 countries were considered as “old” democracies and 
the other 36 as “new” ones. Table A.3 identifies this selection. 
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Figure 5.1 – Fiscal Illusion across the democracies 
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Figure 5.1 shows a downtrend of the Fiscal Illusion level for all of the samples. This 
downtrend follows Wittman (1995), among other authors who have been studying the 
institutional changes produced by the democratic maturity. Wittman (1995), for instance, 
revealed that the maturity of a democracy tends to be associated with a decreasing level of 
fiscal illusion. 
 
However, it is important to stress that in 2006 new democracies or developing countries had a 
level of fiscal illusion equivalent to the one charactering old democracies or developed 
countries in 1960 (0.50). This fact suggests that new democracies or developing countries, on 
average, are exhibiting the fiscal illusion dimensions that the developed world had forty years 
ago. 
 
Briefly analyzing the series, it is observed that the Fiscal Illusion level of new democracies-
developing countries remained stable until 1984/1985, years that signal the beginning of a 
period of diminishing values. After a period of a more significant decrease (1984-1995), the 
level of Fiscal Illusion stabilised until the last temporal observation. In this period, the most 
favourable evolution was verified in the openness of the economies (a rise of 20 percentual 
points, on average), in the reduction of cabinet sizes (about 25% of the initial values, on 
average), in the evolution of the proportion of revenues collected from indirect taxes (a 
reduction of 3 percentual points, on average), and in the ratio between indirect and direct 
taxes (a reduction of 23 percentual points, on average). 
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A different pattern is verified with old democracies-developed countries. In these cases, the 
convergence with the best country-year observation kept a permanent rhythm from 1960 until 
1990, when a period of stabilisation began. For these cases, the variables that show a most 
significant convergence pattern are the percentage of invalid votes (reduction of 4 percentual 
points, on average), the cabinet sizes (reduction of 35% of the initial number of ministries, on 
average), the proportion of capital transfers on capital expenditures (reduction of 14 
percentual points, on average) and the ratio between indirect and direct taxes (reduction of 22 
percentual points, on average). 
 
These periods of slightly constant levels can be interpreted as periods of unchanging patterns 
in the dimensions that produced the Fiscal Illusion index. This reveals that in spite of the 
national and international economic, social and political convulsions there are institutions in 
each country and in each group of countries that maintain the fiscal and political practices 
leading to a certain value of Fiscal Illusion. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper reports a method for building an index of Fiscal Illusion that can be used in much 
the same manner as the recently cited Transparency Indexes. Because the original sense of 
Fiscal Illusion embodies both electoral sides (voters and politicians) this suggestion is more 
relevant to measure the democratic status of the countries. 
 
A very comprehensive database is used to estimate an index for Fiscal Illusion, which enables 
the development of a large portrait of the vitality of the 68 democracies studied since 1960.  
 
After the identification of the theoretical framework, twenty-six variables have been chosen 
according to their use in the cited literature. Considering the nature of the data and the 
limitations of the alternative methods, the percentile rank (as a normalisation method) was 
chosen for each (country-year) observation, taking into account all observations from each 
variable. The chosen method to explain the variance of the observed data through a few linear 
combinations of the original data was a specific technique belonging to the group of the 
Multivariate Analysis – the Multiway Principal Components Analysis (MPCA). Therefore, 
each normalised variable with a significant factor loading (greater than 0.7) had a weight 
equal to the square of the factor loading divided by the explained variation by the factor. At 
the end, each intermediate composite indicator had a weight equal to its proportion of the 
variance explained by all the factors.  
 
In our case, the final value given to each country-year observation is re-scaled, using again the 
percentile rank but considering now all weighted values. Therefore, the Fiscal Illusion Index, 
as a percentile ranking, indicates how a country-year observation performs compared to the 
other country-year observations in its position.  
 
Although it was confirmed that there has been a generalized movement of convergence to the 
observation with the lowest level of Fiscal Illusion, The Fiscal Illusion Index shows that the 
situation varies greatly around the world. It was verified that the countries with the highest 
average values are Mali, Pakistan, Russia and Sri Lanka. Conversely, Austria, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands and New Zealand are some of the countries with the lowest average values. It 
was also observed that the Fiscal Illusion level of new democracies-developing countries 
remained stable until 1984/1985, years that signal the beginning of a period of diminishing 
values. After a period of a more significant decrease (1984-1995), the level of Fiscal Illusion 
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stabilised until the last temporal observation. A different pattern was verified with old 
democracies-developed countries. In these cases, the convergence with the best country-year 
observation had kept a permanent rhythm from 1960 until 1990, when a period of stabilisation 
had begun. These periods of slightly constant levels reveal that in spite of the national and 
international economic, social and political convulsions, there are institutions in each country 
and in each group of countries that maintain the fiscal and political practices leading to a 
certain value of Fiscal Illusion. 
 
The Fiscal Illusion index allows for research on the role of illusory practices by politicians to 
achieve their particular aims deceiving specific electorates. It additionally shows that despite 
being an old idea, primarily suggested in 1903, Fiscal Illusion is a phenomenon that persists 
in democratic countries, conditioning their economies, mainly their fiscal aggregates. 
However, more research needs to be done on the relationship between Fiscal Illusion, 
economic conditions and political realities. 
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ANNEXES 
 
Table A.1 – Dimensions of Fiscal Illusion, related variables and databases 
Dimensions 
studied  
Variables, [short 
denomination]  
Expected 
effect on 
natonal 
Fiscal 
Illusion (by 
a rise of the 
variable)  
Source Number of 
non-missing 
values (1960-
2006, 68 
countries)  
Notes on 
missing 
values 
Herfindahl Index of Public 
Revenues, [txherfind] 
- GFS 1431 a) 
Percentage of taxes on goods 
and services in total taxes 
revenues, [pcgood] 
+ GFS 1592 a) 
Composition of 
Public Revenues 
Ratio between indirect and 
direct taxes revenues, 
[ratcurcap] 
+ GFS 1518 a) 
Percentage of Public Debt in 
the Gross National Income, 
[gnidebt] 
+ WDI 3060  Composition of 
Public Debt 
Percentage of short-term 
public debt in the national 
public debt, [shortdebt] 
- WDI 3060  
Percentage of taxes on 
transfers, on inheritances and 
gifts in total taxes revenues, 
[pcinherita] 
+ GFS 1470 a) Relevance of 
certain revenue 
sources 
Percentage of taxes on 
corporate profits in total taxes 
revenues, [pcprofit] 
+ GFS 1590 a) 
Number of 
governmental 
Ministries 
Size of cabinets, [cabin_size] + CNTSDA 3055  
Percentage of invalid votes in 
parliamentary elections, 
[inv_vot] 
+ VTS1945 1088 a) Immaturity level 
of the 
democracies 
International country risk, 
[icrg] 
- ICRG 2914 a) 
M2 (annual growth rates), 
[money] 
+ IFS 3112  Effectiveness of 
public accounts 
(considering 
Money creation, 
inflation rates 
and public debt) 
Real Public Budget, 
according to Forte (2004), 
[realbud] 
+ IFS 3189 c) 
Government confidence (in 
public polls), [gov_confid] 
+ http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 1592 a) Governmental 
rent-seeking 
Percentage of public 
employees in the active 
population, [pub_employ] 
+ ILO 2048  
Composition of 
Public Capital 
outlays 
Percentage of expenditures on 
capital transfers in the total 
expenditures, [pccaptransf] 
+ GFS 1298 a) 
Openness of the economy, 
[trd] 
- IFS 2653  Relevance of 
trade taxes 
Percentage of trade taxes in 
total taxes revenues, 
[pcinttrade] 
+ GFS 1592 a) 
Number of nonprofit 
organizations per million of 
people, [NPOpmilli] 
- http://www.idealist.org 3196  
Average value of radio 
receptors, tv sets and 
newspapers per capita, 
[mediacs] 
- CNTSDA 3055  
Number of governmental 
checks and balances, [checks] 
- DPI 3196 a) 
Parliamentary power in the 
Democracy, [pres_parl] 
- DPI 3196 a) 
Electorate and 
Parliamentary 
supervision on 
governmental 
activity 
Percentage of education 
expenditures in the total 
expenditures, [pceduc] 
- GFS 898 a) 
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Percentage of higher school 
complete in the total 
population, [highedu] 
- Barro e Lee (2000) 2726 b) 
Percentage of answers stating 
‘economic growth’ as the 
most important national issue, 
[higprefer] 
+ http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 2068 a) 
Herfindahl Index of Public 
Expenditures, [herfdesp] 
- GFS 3194 a)  Public 
expenditures 
manipulation Percentage of capital and 
current transfers in the total 
expenditures, [pctransfpart] 
+ GFS 898 a) 
Legend – CNTSDA: Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (2006); DPI: Database of Political Institutions (2004); GFS: Government 
Finance Statistics (2006); ICRG: International Country Risk Guide (2006); IFS: International Financial Statistics (2006); ILO: International 
Labour Organization Statistics (2006); VTS1945: Voter Turnout since 1945 (2002); WDI: World Development Indicators (2006). 
Notes – a) Due to the scarcity of data in some of the variables provided by the databases, the missing values were substituted by the national 
average values of the pointed variable, following previous proceedings of Shi and Svensson (2002) or Nardo et al. (2005). b) Barro and Lee 
(2000) database provides data in each five years since 1960; therefore, the interstitial missing values were substituted by the value from the 
previous provided year. c) According to Forte (2004), the Real Public Budget is equal to Index of Consumer Prices*Debt/GDP + Nominal 
Deficit. 
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Table A.2 – Fiscal Illusion (FI) Index, 1960 and 2006
 
Country 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
FI 
 
 
FI06-
FI60 
 
FI 
(Mean/sd) 
 
ARGENTINA 1960 0,841   0,492 
ARGENTINA 2006 0,401 -0,44 (0,2041) 
AUSTRALIA 1960 0,496   0,362 
AUSTRALIA 2006 0,270 -0,226 (0,1465) 
AUSTRIA 1960 0,481   0,173 
AUSTRIA 2006 0,088 -0,393 (0,1386) 
BELGIUM 1960 0,754   0,360 
BELGIUM 2006 0,250 -0,504 (0,205) 
BOLIVIA 1960 0,776   0,647 
BOLIVIA 2006 0,564 -0,212 (0,130) 
BRAZIL 1960 0,551   0,459 
BRAZIL 2006 0,366 -0,185 (0,113) 
BULGARIA 1960 0,477   0,325 
BULGARIA 2006 0,283 -0,194 (0,092) 
CANADA 1960 0,439   0,203 
CANADA 2006 0,116 -0,323 (0,127) 
CHILE 1960 0,848   0,501 
CHILE 2006 0,327 -0,521 (0,166) 
COLOMBIA 1960 0,875   0,654 
COLOMBIA 2006 0,598 -0,277 (0,129) 
COSTA_RICA 1960 0,756   0,324 
COSTA_RICA 2006 0,300 -0,456 (0,161) 
CYPRUS 1960 0,770   0,565 
CYPRUS 2006 0,474 -0,296 (0,155) 
CZECH_REP 1960 0,474   0,396 
CZECH_REP 2006 0,243 -0,231 (0,196) 
DENMARK 1960 0,339   0,183 
DENMARK 2006 0,121 -0,218 (0,093) 
DOMINICAN 1960 0,845   0,615 
DOMINICAN 2006 0,311 -0,534 (0,212) 
ECUADOR 1960 0,600   0,475 
ECUADOR 2006 0,349 -0,251 (0,115) 
EL_SALVADOR 1960 0,979   0,836 
EL_SALVADOR 2006 0,569 -0,41 (0,137) 
ESTONIA 1960 0,421   0,401 
ESTONIA 2006 0,380 -0,041 (0,041) 
FIJI 1960 0,523   0,457 
FIJI 2006 0,395 -0,128 (0,173) 
FINLAND 1960 0,438   0,155 
FINLAND 2006 0,070 -0,368 (0,115) 
FRANCE 1960 0,533   0,512 
FRANCE 2006 0,433 -0,100 (0,097) 
GERMANY 1960 0,496   0,222 
GERMANY 2006 0,117 -0,379 (0,155) 
GREECE 1960 0,912   0,674 
GREECE 2006 0,447 -0,465 (0,178) 
GUATEMALA 1960 0,963   0,837 
GUATEMALA 2006 0,799 -0,164 (0,080) 
HONDURAS 1960 0,913   0,886 
HONDURAS 2006 0,859 -0,054 (0,047) 
HUNGARY 1960 0,756   0,635 
HUNGARY 2006 0,551 -0,205 (0,091) 
ICELAND 1960 0,441   0,187 
ICELAND 2006 0,147 -0,294 (0,106) 
INDIA 1960 0,928   0,876 
INDIA 2006 0,833 -0,095 (0,056) 
IRELAND 1960 0,580   0,239 
IRELAND 2006 0,105 -0,475 (0,172) 
ISRAEL 1960 0,492   0,399 
ISRAEL 2006 0,306 -0,186 (0,119) 
ITALY 1960 0,811   0,489 
ITALY 2006 0,312 -0,499 (0,196) 
JAPAN 1960 0,619   0,424 
JAPAN 2006 0,346 -0,273 (0,188) 
KOREA 1960 0,878   0,625 
KOREA 2006 0,426 -0,452 (0,163) 
LITHUANIA 1960 0,668   0,487 
LITHUANIA 2006 0,294 -0,374 (0,106) 
LUXEMBOURG 1960 0,170   0,174 
LUXEMBOURG 2006 0,177 0,007 (0,026) 
MADAGASCAR 1960 0,906   0,857 
MADAGASCAR 2006 0,849 -0,057 (0,047) 
MALAYSIA 1960 0,678   0,568 
MALAYSIA 2006 0,480 -0,198 (0,136) 
MALI 1960 0,929   0,936 
MALI 2006 0,943 0,014 (0,024) 
MAURITIUS 1960 0,817   0,692 
MAURITIUS 2006 0,649 -0,168 (0,079) 
MEXICO 1960 0,797   0,543 
MEXICO 2006 0,455 -0,342 (0,212) 
NEPAL 1960 0,550   0,623 
NEPAL 2006 0,696 0,146 (0,102) 
NETHERLANDS 1960 0,368   0,122 
NETHERLANDS 2006 0,062 -0,306 (0,103) 
NEW ZEALAND 1960 0,227   0,052 
NEW ZEALAND 2006 0,022 -0,205 (0,055) 
NICARAGUA 1960 0,886   0,752 
NICARAGUA 2006 0,594 -0,292 (0,116) 
NORWAY 1960 0,551   0,249 
NORWAY 2006 0,145 -0,406 (0,154) 
PAKISTAN 1960 0,967   0,951 
PAKISTAN 2006 0,935 -0,032 (0,064) 
PANAMA 1960 0,698   0,608 
PANAMA 2006 0,518 -0,18 (0,117) 
PAPUA 1960 0,588   0,617 
PAPUA 2006 0,646 0,058 (0,091) 
PARAGUAY 1960 0,990   0,824 
PARAGUAY 2006 0,712 -0,278 (0,169) 
PERU 1960 0,935   0,778 
PERU 2006 0,768 -0,167 (0,123) 
PHILIPINES 1960 0,889   0,817 
PHILIPINES 2006 0,685 -0,204 (0,076) 
POLAND 1960 0,986   0,890 
POLAND 2006 0,767 -0,219           (0,092) 
PORTUGAL 1960 0,791   0,461 
PORTUGAL 2006 0,276 -0,515 (0,199) 
ROMANIA 1960 0,863   0,738 
ROMANIA 2006 0,646 -0,217 (0,257) 
RUSSIA 1960 0,999   0,931 
RUSSIA 2006 0,830 -0,169 (0,091) 
SLOVAKIA 1960 0,422   0,412 
SLOVAKIA 2006 0,337 -0,085 (0,092) 
SLOVENIA 1960 0,479   0,536 
SLOVENIA 2006 0,592 0,113 (0,110) 
SOUTH_AFRICA 1960 0,627   0,563 
SOUTH_AFRICA 2006 0,396 -0,231 (0,129) 
SPAIN 1960 0,617   0,278 
SPAIN 2006 0,090 -0,527 (0,199) 
SRI_LANKA 1960 0,992   0,970 
SRI_LANKA 2006 0,927 -0,065 (0,031) 
SWEDEN 1960 0,370   0,163 
SWEDEN 2006 0,069 -0,301 (0,128) 
SWITZERLAND 1960 0,242   0,125 
SWITZERLAND 2006 0,102 -0,14 (0,090) 
TRINIDAD 1960 0,762   0,711 
TRINIDAD 2006 0,666 -0,096 (0,068) 
TURKEY 1960 0,838   0,590 
TURKEY 2006 0,401 -0,437 (0,199) 
UK 1960 0,633   0,328 
UK 2006 0,232 -0,401 (0,183) 
US 1960 0,381   0,221 
US 2006 0,219 -0,162 (0,087) 
URUGUAY 1960 0,933   0,780 
URUGUAY 2006 0,760 -0,173 (0,120) 
VENEZUELA 1960 0,796   0,583 
VENEZUELA 2006 0,487 -0,309 (0,143) 
 28 
Table A.3 - Countries and values from variables "Old" and "Developed"  
Country Old Developed 
ARGENTINA 0 0 
AUSTRALIA 1 1 
AUSTRIA 1 1 
BELGIUM 1 1 
BOLIVIA 0 0 
BRAZIL 0 0 
BULGARIA 0 0 
CANADA 1 1 
CHILE 0 0 
COLOMBIA 1 0 
COSTA_RICA 1 0 
CYPRUS 1 0 
CZECH_REP 0 0 
DENMARK 1 1 
DOMINICAN 0 0 
ECUADOR 0 0 
EL_SALVADOR 0 0 
ESTONIA 0 0 
FIJI 0 0 
FINLAND 1 1 
FRANCE 1 1 
GERMANY 1 1 
GREECE 0 1 
GUATEMALA 0 0 
HONDURAS 0 0 
HUNGARY 0 0 
ICELAND 1 1 
INDIA 1 0 
IRELAND 1 1 
ISRAEL 1 0 
ITALY 1 1 
JAPAN 1 1 
KOREA 0 0 
LITHUANIA 0 0 
LUXEMBOURG 1 1 
MADAGASCAR 0 0 
MALAYSIA 1 0 
MALI 0 0 
MAURITIUS 1 0 
MEXICO 0 0 
NEPAL 0 0 
NETHERLANDS 1 1 
NZ 1 1 
NICARAGUA 0 0 
NORWAY 1 1 
PAKISTAN 0 0 
PANAMA 0 0 
PAPUA 1 0 
PARAGUAY 0 0 
PERU 0 0 
PHILIPINES 0 0 
POLAND 0 0 
PORTUGAL 0 1 
ROMANIA 0 0 
RUSSIA 0 0 
SLOVAKIA 0 0 
SLOVENIA 0 0 
SOUTH_AFRICA 1 0 
SPAIN 0 1 
SRI_LANKA 1 0 
SWEDEN 1 1 
SWITZERLAND 1 1 
TRINIDAD 1 0 
TURKEY 0 1 
UK 1 1 
US 1 1 
URUGUAY 0 0 
VENEZUELA 1 0 
Note: Coefficient of correlation between “Old” and 
“Developed” = 0,537. 
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Figure A.1: Fiscal Illusion Index and simulated values, 1960 and 2006 
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Figure A.2 – 90% confidence intervals of the Fiscal Illusion Index 
 
5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution of the Fiscal Illusion Index, FII (1960)
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
0,08
0,1
0,12
0,14
0,16
0,18
0,2
L
U
X
E
M
B
O
U
R
G N
Z
D
E
N
M
A
R
K
S
W
E
D
E
N
S
L
O
V
E
N
IA
C
A
N
A
D
A
C
Z
E
C
H
_
R
E
P
A
U
S
T
R
IA
A
U
S
T
R
A
L
IA
F
R
A
N
C
E
N
O
R
W
A
Y
F
IJ
I
P
A
P
U
A
S
P
A
IN
S
O
U
T
H
_
A
F
R
IC
A
U
K
M
A
L
A
Y
S
IA
C
Y
P
R
U
S
B
E
L
G
IU
M
C
O
S
T
A
 R
IC
A
V
E
N
E
Z
U
E
L
A
IT
A
L
Y
T
U
R
K
E
Y
D
O
M
IN
IC
A
N
R
O
M
A
N
IA
K
O
R
E
A
P
H
IL
IP
IN
E
S
M
A
D
A
G
A
S
C
A
R
H
O
N
D
U
R
A
S
M
A
L
I
P
E
R
U
P
A
K
IS
T
A
N
P
O
L
A
N
D
S
R
I_
L
A
N
K
A
countries
F
I
I
(
9
5
t
h
p
e
r
c
)
-
F
I
I
(
5
t
h
p
e
r
c
)
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
F
I
I
 
(
r
a
w
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
)
 
5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution of the Fiscal Illusion Index, FII (2006)
0
0,01
0,02
0,03
0,04
0,05
0,06
0,07
0,08
0,09
0,1
N
Z
N
E
T
H
E
R
L
A
N
D
S
F
IN
L
A
N
D
S
P
A
IN
IR
E
L
A
N
D
G
E
R
M
A
N
Y
N
O
R
W
A
Y
L
U
X
E
M
B
O
U
R
G U
K
B
E
L
G
IU
M
P
O
R
T
U
G
A
L
L
IT
H
U
A
N
IA
IS
R
A
E
L
IT
A
L
Y
S
L
O
V
A
K
IA
E
C
U
A
D
O
R
E
S
T
O
N
IA
S
O
U
T
H
_
A
F
R
IC
A
T
U
R
K
E
Y
F
R
A
N
C
E
M
E
X
IC
O
M
A
L
A
Y
S
IA
P
A
N
A
M
A
B
O
L
IV
IA
S
L
O
V
E
N
IA
C
O
L
O
M
B
IA
R
O
M
A
N
IA
P
H
IL
I P
IN
E
S
P
A
R
A
G
U
A
Y
P
O
L
A
N
D
G
U
A
T
E
M
A
L
A
IN
D
IA
H
O
N
D
U
R
A
S
P
A
K
IS
T
A
N
countries
F
I
I
(
9
5
t
h
p
e
r
c
)
-
F
I
I
(
5
t
h
p
e
r
c
)
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
F
I
I
 
(
r
a
w
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
)
 
 
 31 
 
Figure A.3 – Links between Fiscal Illusion Index values and GDP per capita, Country risk, Corruption Perception and Governance Indicators (year: 2000) 
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